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Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) often channels the contributions of its member countries through other international 
development organizations (IDOs) to implement its development programs and activities. Why do EU member 
countries who delegate their foreign aid to these EU institutions allow the Commission to further delegate the 
use of these resources to such IDOs? We argue that governments face a trade-off between visibility and 
effectiveness. Pooling foreign aid resources in the EU increases the visibility of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor. Yet, while the increase in resources makes the EU a more powerful actor in developing countries, it 
oftentimes does not have the capacity to use these resources effectively. Delegating aid to IDOs helps the EU 
to solve this capacity problem, but it also reduces the benefits regarding visibility. Double delegation also 
limits the control that member states can exert over EU development policies. Consequently, double delegation 
is more likely when the EU’s capacity as an aid donor is low and when no strategic interests of EU members 
are at stake. We also show that the Commission tries to mitigate the loss of control by earmarking the 
delegated aid projects more tightly. Our empirical analysis is based on our own coding of project-level 
information in the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System, document analysis, and interviews at the EU, the Word 
Bank, and bilateral donors. The results generally support our theoretical expectations.  
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International Studies (SNIS) for funding our research on the politics of multi-bi aid. In addition, we thank our 
interview partners at the European Commission, the World Bank, and donor government representatives from 
France and Germany for their time and their effort to help us understand this complex phenomenon. 
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With an aid volume of over 16 billion USD in 2014—corresponding to about 25% of the 
combined bilateral development assistance of its member states—the EU institutions have 
developed into the single largest multilateral donor; since 2010, they have been surpassing even 
the World Bank (Schneider and Tobin 2016). A large part of this assistance is not managed by 
the European Commission (EC), but delegated further to trust funds at other international 
development organizations (IDOs). By doing so, the EC follows a trend recently observed for 
many bilateral donors (Reinsberg et al. 2015; Graham 2015). Over the last two decades, bilateral 
donors have increasingly relied on voluntary contributions to IDOs that are earmarked to support 
specific development priorities. From the perspective of the bilateral donor, this so-called ‘multi-
bi aid’ combines the flexibility of bilateral aid with the advantages of donor coordination within 
a multilateral setting, and with the possibility of benefitting from the capacity of large 
specialized development agencies (OECD 2011). Earmarking allows donor governments to make 
their multi-bi contributions more visible than core multilateral aid, and to link them to perceived 
national interests, e.g., regarding trade, investment, and migration. At the same time, these 
contributions are widely considered as standard multilateral aid, which wins the sympathies of 
those who value the multilaterals precisely because they are usually less driven by domestic 
interest and more focused on efficient development outcomes (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and 
Eichenauer 2015: 530). 
This direct electoral connection does not exist for the EU. Within the EU, members have 
already pooled and coordinated their aid. Why should the EU further delegate to other IDOs? 
The phenomenon is even more puzzling when considering that double delegation is relatively 
costly. Direct costs arise because IDOs charge significant fees for their services (Michaelowa, 
Reinsberg and Schneider 2016), and indirect costs occur because the visibility of the original 
donor is reduced. Why do EU member states delegate such a substantial part of their 
development assistance to the EU if the latter just delegates it further, and often to IDOs to which 
individual member states also delegate some of their bilateral aid directly?  
In this paper, we analyze the conditions under which double delegation occurs. We argue 
that this phenomenon can be explained by a trade-off between visibility and effectiveness. EU 
member states want to increase the EU’s role and importance as a foreign policy actor and a 
visible champion of international development. However, the Commission’s capacity to manage 
development aid is severely constrained (OECD 2012: 20; Michaelowa, Reinsberg and 
Schneider 2016). Other more specialized IDOs, such as the World Bank, are much more 
experienced and maintain well-resourced country offices in virtually all developing countries. 
Channeling aid through IDOs can hence be much more effective, especially in those areas in 
which the EU’s capacity gaps are greatest. Yet—especially in areas in which they have strategic 
interests—EU members may be worried about losing control over foreign aid policies. We 
expect less double delegation when the strategic interests of EU member states are high. Along 
similar lines, once there is double-delegation, we expect tighter geographic or sector-specific 
earmarking in areas of strategic interest. EU members with particularly salient preferences can 
induce the Commission to ensure that these preferences are considered through earmarking. 
More generally, members can ensure that the EC uses earmarking to retain some control over the 
double-delegated contributions by a tighter monitoring of aid activities. 
To test our theory, we combine the results of both qualitative and quantitative analyses. The 
quantitative analysis is based on specific coding of project-level information on development 
assistance to obtain the channels through which the EU allocates its aid, and the degree of 
earmarking for the period from 1990 to 2012 (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017). The qualitative 
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analysis is based on interviews with about 40 respondents at all levels of the double-delegation 
chain. We interviewed EC staff, staff at the World Bank—the IDO towards which the EC most 
frequently delegates its aid—and staff from selected EU member countries. In line with our 
expectations, we find that double delegation primarily occurs when development projects are 
directed toward recipient countries where the EC lacks capacity. Strategic interests among EU 
member states prevent the EC from delegating to IDOs. Once there is double delegation, we find 
that the EC more strictly earmarks aid to IDOs in contexts in which member states are generally 
more reluctant to agree to double delegation in the first place. The findings imply that 
earmarking serves as a mechanism to mitigate the loss of control. Finally, earmarking is more 
prevalent when member state preferences are heterogeneous. 
The findings provide some first insights into the increasing practice of double delegation, 
suggesting an explanation of why international organizations further delegate activities to other 
organizations, and how this relates to the strategic interaction between EU member states on the 
one hand, and their agents at the EC and the secondary IDO level on the other hand. Our work 
contributes to the broader literature, which applies principal-agent theory to international 
organizations (Pollack 1997; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006). We demonstrate 
how the European Commission navigates the conflicting goals of donor visibility and 
development effectiveness, especially when it faces capacity constraints. Simultaneously, our 
analysis offers a new way of thinking about the phenomenon of multi-bi aid. Multi-bi aid has so 
far been primarily examined from the perspective of bilateral donors with a focus on electoral 
incentives on the one hand (Eichenauer and Hug 2016), and potential benefits from donor 
cooperation on the other hand (Reinsberg et al. 2017). Neither of this is directly relevant for 
IDOs, such as the EU, where the trade-off between capacity and visibility emerges as the driving 
mechanism. While our analysis focuses on double delegation in the EU, they speak to similar 
patterns of double delegation in other international organizations as well. A prominent example 
in global public health is the Global Fund, a quasi-multilateral organization that delegates most 
of its funding earmarked for three communicable diseases through the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (Sridhar and Woods 2013). Similarly, the GEF relies on several other 
multilateral agencies—notably the UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank—for the development 
and implementation of its environmental programs (Bayer et al. 2014; Graham and Thompson 
2015).1 
DOUBLE DELEGATION AND MULTI-BI AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This section provides some further background on the broader phenomenon of double delegation 
and multi-bi financing with a focus on the EU. Double delegation is a phenomenon that can be 
observed in various fields of international policy. It occurs whenever member states delegate 
tasks to international organizations that in turn delegate parts of these to other international 
organizations and implementing agencies.  
                                                            
1 It should be noted that, as far as the role of the organization initially in charge is merely one of initiating, 
convening, coordinating, and assisting the work of other multilateral organizations, this is considered as 
orchestration rather than delegation (Abbott et al. 2015, 2016). However, much of the above-mentioned 
collaborations between international organizations go well beyond orchestration as they are based on regular formal 
contracts entrusting the implementing agencies with those tasks that the primary organization cannot fulfill itself and 
providing all financial means to fulfill these tasks. 
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Double delegation in development finance mainly occurs through the European Union, 
where it corresponds to so-called “multi-bi aid” (Michaelowa et al. 2016).2 EU member states 
provide resources to the EU to finance the EU’s development policies, and the EU delegates the 
development and implementation of aid programs to a multilateral donor. Over time, the EU has 
developed into a larger donor than even the World Bank. As a bilateral donor, it ranks third after 
the United States and Germany. EU members provide about 17% of their foreign aid resources 
through one of the three EU channels relevant for development aid: the common EU budget, the 
European Development Fund (EDF), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Further 
delegation from the EU to other IDOs has increased dramatically over the last few years. Until 
the mid-2000s, the EU’s multi-bi aid accounted for less than 2% of its entire aid budget (Figure 
1). The growth of EU multi-bi aid started later than in EU member states, but then increased 
even faster. In 2012, the EU delegated almost a quarter of its aid to IDOs, while the EU member 
states individually channeled only 13% of bilateral development assistance through multilateral 
agencies. 
 
Figure 1: The Development of Multi-bi Aid 
 
Notes: Reproduced from Michaelowa, Reinsberg, and Schneider (2016)  
Data source: Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) 
 
Between 2002 and 2012, the EU delegated about 50% of its multi-bi aid to various UN 
organizations, about 20% to regional development organizations, and the remaining 30% to 
multilateral development banks, notably the World Bank. The latter was the single most 
important IDO for the EU’s multi-bi aid. The EU and the World Bank have a long-standing 
partnership, governed by a Framework Agreement concluded in 2001. Over time, the EU has 
become the second largest donor to IBRD/IDA trust funds, after the United Kingdom and ahead 
of the United States (World Bank 2013a: 8). It contributed not only to multi-donor trust funds, 
but also established large single-donor trust funds (with no other partners involved), notably the 
USD78 billion EC-ACP Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program (World Bank 2012: 10).  
                                                            
2 When the EU delegates foreign aid resources to other IDOs, one should speak of “multi-multi” aid. To avoid a 
plethora of terms and to keep the discussion parsimonious we keep using the accepted “multi-bi” aid terminology.  
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In principle, the Commission could delegate the resources without imposing any constraints, 
i.e., giving full freedom to the IDO receiving the funding. But this hardly ever happens. For 
virtually all projects, the Commission prescribes at least a broader regional focus, and oftentimes 
even specifies the specific recipient country (geographic earmarking). Similarly, the Commission 
frequently pre-defines the sector in which the money must be spent (sector earmarking). By 
conditioning the delegated resources to the use in specific localities and sectors, the Commission 
can ensure that specific preferences of EU member states must be respected. 
 THE POLITICS OF DOUBLE DELEGATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
To develop our theoretical argument, we focus on the preferences of the three types of actors 
involved in the double delegation chain (see Figure 2): (1) the EU member countries who 
delegate their aid to the EU, (2) the EC who serves as the managing and implementing agency of 
foreign aid resources that are provided by the EU member states, and (3) other IDOs to whom 
the EC may delegate its aid resources (under the condition that this is approved by the member 
states).  
For simplicity, we assume that IDOs are always ready to accept the EC’s multi-bi aid. The 
additional funding expands the IDO’s budget through both the aid resources transferred and the 
additional fees for trust fund management. The additional funding should easily compensate the 
IDO’s own cost incurred related to the services they provide. However, the IDO may have its 
own funding priorities that are not necessarily in line with the priorities of the Commission and 
EU member states. What exactly these priorities are differs between IDOs and is not relevant for 
our discussion here. What is important to retain is that preferences need not be fully aligned so 
that the loss of control over EU funding delegated to other IDOs comes along with some cost 
that add to the direct cost for the IDO’s administration of the related trust fund. Similarly, there 
is an indirect cost due to a loss of some of the visibility for the EU, so that the benefits of 
delegating to the Commission in the first place are somewhat reduced. 
 
Figure 2: Double Delegation of EU Aid 
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Indeed, for EU member states, the main advantage of delegating aid is that the pooling of 
resources contributes to the development of a single strong European agency with high 
international visibility. Through their participation in EU development programs, EU member 
countries have become more much important and powerful partners of recipient countries in 
international development. The position as a “champion of the developing world” has not only 
brought the EU respect as a supporter of economic development around the globe, but also 
provided a number of strategic advantages in other areas, most notably trade. For example, many 
countries (most of them receiving large amounts of the EU’s foreign aid) stood by the EU when 
it challenged the US-favored “scientific principle” that guides the rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on the restrictions on food imports (Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Schneider 
and Urpelainen 2013). By now, most of the developing world has ratified the Cartagena Protocol 
that propagates the EU-favored “precautionary principle,” which de facto allows the EU to 
restrict the import of genetically modified organisms (GMO) from the US and other GMO-
producing countries. The drawback of the delegation to EU institutions is that the EC is a multi-
purpose agency that manages all the EU’s policies. The EU budget is generally very small (note, 
however, that the EDF funds are outside of the EU budget), and less than five percent of the EU 
budget is spent on the entire body of administrative staff. It should not come as a surprise then 
that in development assistance, the EC has not yet developed the level of professional expertise 
and experience of other IDOs. Consequently, its interventions may be less efficient (Mrak and 
Tilev 2008; Knezevic 2011; OECD 2012).  
To improve the effectiveness of EU development assistance while at the same time retaining 
the visibility of the EU in international development finance, it may be optimal to have the EC 
channel parts of its development finance to other IDOs. While double delegation reduces the 
visibility and influence of the EU gained through its emergence as a large donor, this reduction 
in visibility is smaller than if the funds had been channeled to the IDOs directly from the 
individual EU member states. At the same time, the longer chain of delegation reduces the 
influence EU member states can exert over the concrete allocation of funds, thereby potentially 
limiting their incentives to agree to double delegation. The costs imposed by a loss of influence 
are greater the more the IDO’s allocation departs from the ideal aid preferences of the member 
states. EU members should be particularly concerned about this loss in areas of strategic 
relevance, and in areas where the visibility of the EU is particularly important to them. For 
example, the cost from a loss of control should be particularly great when EU members’ 
geopolitical and/or commercial interests are at stake, especially when the IDO allocates the aid 
resources for (non-strategic) economic development or if the strategic interests of the IDO 
members conflict with the strategic interests of the EU members.  
From the perspective of the Commission, the funds channeled from EU members to the EU 
are a welcome contribution to the EU’s overall budget, ensuring its stability at a high level or 
even its further growth (Vaubel 1996, 2006; Frey 1997; Pollack 1997). Furthermore, the EC 
benefits from the expansion of its own role as a powerful international aid agency. Obviously, 
the Commission is equally aware of its capacity constraints and sees potential efficiency gains 
from further delegation to other IDOs. When it comes to the decision on further delegation to 
other IDOs, the trade-off for the Commission hence looks like the one for individual member 
countries: While further delegation may increase efficiency – especially in areas in which the 
EC’s own capacity is particularly limited – it reduces the benefits related to the visibility of the 
EU as a powerful international actor. In terms of geographic or sectoral aid allocation, there is 
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also no reason to believe that there should be a relevant divergence of interest between the 
Commission and EU member states. In contrast to other IDOs such as the World Bank, the 
Commission as a primarily administrative body has never developed its own distinct 
development ideology, and its substantive orientation is clearly derived from the one of its 
members. And even if the Commission prefers to provide aid differently (e.g., it might have 
stronger preferences to provide aid to support economic development), the decision to delegate 
aid resources to other IDOs has to be approved by the EU member states unanimously, which 
grants them greater control over the EC’s decisions. We therefore expect the preferences of the 
EU member states and the EC to be well aligned at least relative to the preferences of the IDO to 
which they may further delegate.  
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the situation for the case in which the utility function of the 
Commission is slightly more to the right than the utility function of EU members (i.e. the 
Commission is more likely to prefer delegating to IDOs). To simplify the illustration, members 
are depicted by a single curve for one representative member country (below we discuss the 
implications if member states’ preferences are heterogeneous). For each of the two actors, we 
show the utility as a function of further delegation to another IDO (solid yellow and blue lines), 
whereby movements to the right imply greater delegation. We assume that the trade-off between 
efficiency-reducing capacity constraints and visibility/control leads to very low utility for both 
very low and very high double delegation, and to a bliss point with maximum utility somewhere 
in between. Earmarking is an option that can mitigate the loss of influence, by imposing more 
constraints on the IDO. We illustrate this by graphing the utility of both actors as a function of 
more earmarking (dashed yellow and blue lines), whereby movements to the left imply stricter 
earmarking. Rather than to reduce delegation to IDOs, the Commission can also earmark the 
delegated funds which ensures EU member states that the resources are spent on development 
projects that are in line with their interests. But earmarking is not costless because it requires the 
investment of time and effort spent to define the relevant geographical or sectoral conditions, as 
well as the relevant knowledge and experience to ensure that the funds are spent efficiently. 
Therefore, in areas in which the Commission’s capacity constraints are particularly prevalent, 
one should expect less rather than more earmarking.  
 
Figure 3: Optimization by the EC and EU member states 
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Based on the depiction in Figure 3, we can now assess in some more detail the factors that 
contribute to the two decisions on double delegation and earmarking. We argue that capacity 
constraints, the relevance of visibility, and the need for control can explain how much the EC is 
willing and able to double delegate, and how tightly it will earmark its contributions to IDOs. 
The factors should either move both the EC’s and the EU members’ utility function to the right 
on both decisions (more double delegation, less earmarking), or move them jointly to the left on 
both decisions (less double delegation, more earmarking). While capacity constraints should 
increase incentives to double delegate and to minimize earmarking, the relevance of visibility 
and the importance of control should reduce the incentives to double delegate while maximizing 
the tightness of earmarking.  
Regarding capacity, we consider that not all aid projects are equally demanding for the EC. 
For instance, it has a long-standing experience in cooperation with some world regions, notably 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) with whom the EC has been 
collaborating since the very beginning of its development program in 1957, and to a lesser extent 
the countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004. 
Moreover, common language with the partner country or a general increase in EC staff may 
reduce the Commission’s capacity constraint. Finally, capacity can be conceived in a relative 
way, by comparing the EC’s capacity to the one of other IDOs to which it could further delegate 
its funds. Many donors expect substantial gains driven by economies of scale in large donor 
organizations like the World Bank and by the expertise of their staff (Hicks et al. 2008; Milner 
and Tingley 2010). The consideration of a greater pool of experienced staff should be important, 
particularly when the EC itself has relatively little capacity and expertise. To make full use of the 
IDO’s superior expertise and to reap the full efficiency gains from double delegation, one should 
also expect the EU to allow the IDO full control over the aid resources by avoiding any 
earmarking or reducing it to a minimum. When the EC’s own capacity is relatively high, the 
opposite should be the case. Based on the above arguments, we can formulate our first set of 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Double delegation is less likely for projects in recipient countries 
where the EC has relatively more capacity and expertise, all else equal. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Earmarking is more likely for projects in recipient countries where the 
EC has relatively more capacity and expertise, all else equal. 
 
In addition, we argue that the fear of a loss in influence over aid allocation decisions matters for 
decisions over double-delegation. Some projects are of strategic relevance to EU member states, 
either commercially (e.g., because of a strong trade relationship) or politically (i.e., because they 
are at the core of what identifies the EU as a donor organization). The relationship with the ACP 
and ENP countries are particularly relevant in this respect. Their special relationship owes to 
their strategic importance to the EU member states. This may also explain why the EC has 
greater capacity in this area. In addition, foreign aid that is directed toward recipient countries 
with strong economic ties to EU member states should be less likely to be double delegated. In 
contrast, the EC should be more likely to delegate foreign aid to IDOs, especially for capacity 
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concerns, if strategic interests of EU member states are not at stake. The corresponding logic 
holds for the likelihood of earmarking. This leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Double delegation is less likely for projects in recipient countries 
where strategic interests are involved. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Earmarking is more likely for projects in recipient countries where 
strategic interests are involved. 
 
We simplified the discussion above by assuming a single representative member country. In 
reality, the interests of member countries often differ and the extent to which this is the case may 
itself influence double delegation and earmarking. Since all member countries have to agree on 
the Commission’s delegation of resources to another IDO, strong heterogeneity in member 
preferences should lead to less double delegation or to double delegation linked with strong 
earmarking, which may be an option to convince the most reluctant member that its preferences 
will be ensured, and control can be maintained over the IDO’s allocation decisions. This 
argument is in line with previous literature that finds that bilateral donors tend not to delegate aid 
in the first place when their preferences are very heterogeneous (Schneider and Tobin 2013). 
This leads to our last set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Double delegation is less likely for projects in recipient countries 
related to which EU members have heterogeneous preferences. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Earmarking is more likely for projects in recipient countries related to 
which EU members have heterogeneous preferences. 
DATA AND METHODS 
We test the implications of our theory using two complementary sources of evidence. We 
conduct regression analysis to assess the EU's patterns of double delegation and earmarking of 
multi-bi aid activities. Moreover, we illustrate the causal mechanism with qualitative evidence 
from the multi-bi partnership between the EC and the World Bank. Our quantitative data cover 
the EC’s aid activities for the 1990-2012 period. All general aid-related data are based either on 
the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) or the OECD data on aggregate flows (OECD 2013a, b). For activities 
delegated to IDOs, we use the multi-bi aid dataset by Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017), which 
complements the existing OECD data on aid channeled through multilaterals by coding 
qualitative information on transition channels for additional years and by including information 
on earmarking along several dimensions. Specific additional data for the EC and the World Bank 
are drawn from our own coding based on the organizations’ webpages, EU budget reports, and 
the World Bank’s (2013c) Trust fund databases. All general recipient country information is 
taken from the World Bank’s (2014) World Development Indicators and Eurostat (2015). For a 
detailed description of all variables and sources, see Appendix Table A1. The data are originally 
at the project level, but our unit of analysis is at the recipient country–year level, which allows us 
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to directly assess the impact of different recipient country characteristics on the EC’s delegation 
patterns. We follow Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) and exclude all aid flows dedicated to debt 
relief and humanitarian aid, which are distinct from aid activities for substantive development 
purposes. We also drop all aid activities that are not allocable to individual recipient countries. 
Our qualitative analysis draws on evidence from both interviews and official documents. 
Overall, we conducted more than 40 interviews with EC officials, World Bank staff, and 
individual bilateral donors. Our interviews at the Commission covered different respondents at 
the Directorates-General for International Co-operation and Development (DEVCO / 
EuropeAid) as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS). Our interviews at the 
World Bank purposively sampled on those individuals with experience on the EC and from 
different sectoral departments (see Appendix Table A2 for a list of interviews). For our 
documentary analysis, the most relevant document is the ‘Financial Regulation’, which governs 
the relationship between the EC and IDOs. Based on this regulation, which was last updated by 
the member states and the European Parliament in March 2013, the EC concludes framework 
agreements with the IDOs with which it intends to cooperate. These framework agreements 
require the IDOs to have minimum standards on accounting, internal control, audit, and 
procurement. Furthermore, the Financial Regulation obliges the EC to maintain some 
prerogatives of control and verification (EC 2014). The specific partnership between the EC and 
the World Bank is formalized in the Trust Fund and Co-Financing Framework Agreement 
concluded in the early 2000s and periodically updated. It applies to all EC entities and to all trust 
funds of the EC with the World Bank (see EC 2013; World Bank 2013b).  
Variables 
The selection of variables for our models closely follows the discussion in the theory above. In a 
first step, we analyze the determinants of double delegation. The dependent variable of the 
double delegation regressions is measured as the percentage of EU aid to a recipient that is 
channeled through an IDO each year. In a second step, we analyze the extent to which the EU’s 
multi-bi aid is earmarked. The dependent variable of the earmarking regressions is the 
percentage of all double delegated EU aid that is earmarked either geographically to specific 
countries, or by sector. We consider both dimensions separately. While our theory does not 
suggest any specific differences, it is evident that with a mean of 94% geographic earmarking is 
much more frequent than sector earmarking with a mean of 20% (see Appendix, Table A1). 
These differences could imply some different dynamics and it may thus be interesting to 
compare the two specifications. 
To test Hypothesis 1, we include several factors related to capacity. We use indicator 
variables for recipients in the two regions in which the EC arguably has the greatest experience, 
i.e. ACP and the ENP countries, and for recipients for which one of the national languages 
corresponds to the language of at least one EU member country. We further use a count of EC 
staff (logged), although unfortunately, we do not have the information directly related to the 
recipient countries and local delegations of EC staff, but only for the EC. To capture the relative 
perspective, we also include information on the major IDO that may represent an alternative, 
namely the World Bank. We do not have information on the number of local staff, but we know 
whether there is a World Bank office in the respective country (WB office), and we know the 
volume of aid for which it is responsible (WB amount). 
To test Hypothesis 2, we include variables related to strategic interests, but also variables 
that, in contrast, suggest a purely developmental motivation of aid. To capture economic interest, 
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we use the export share of the three influential EU members Germany, France and United 
Kingdom (EU-3) in percent of all their exports to developing countries. To measure 
developmental needs, we include three variables related to poverty and vulnerability: life 
expectancy (logged), GDP per capita (logged) and an indicator variable for fragile states. In 
addition, the above introduced regional variables (ACP and ENP countries) can be interpreted as 
indicators of geopolitical interest (note that most ACP countries are former colonies). The EC 
should be less likely to double delegate aid to recipients in the ACP/ENP regions and to those 
that trade more with the EU; it should be more likely to double delegate aid to poor and 
vulnerable recipients. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we include measures of interest heterogeneity in the EU. Matching our 
decision to individually observe geographical and sectoral earmarking, we define EU member 
heterogeneity along the same two dimensions. Assuming that members’ own bilateral aid 
allocation corresponds to their individual preferences over multilateral aid allocation (Schneider 
and Tobin 2013, 2016), we use the different shares of bilateral aid they allocate to any given 
recipient in any given year to compute a coefficient of variation that captures member 
heterogeneity. For the heterogeneity of sectoral preferences, we further distinguish between 
sector shares within each recipient (see Appendix 1 for a formal exposition). Both measures are 
based on the EU-15 subset of members because new members have not been official aid donors 
until recently, and even in most recent years, they have contributed relatively little bilateral aid 
so that their inclusion may be misleading.  
We include further control variables, namely EC aid growth to put the EC staff numbers into 
perspective, a dummy for the period after the Paris Declaration in 2005 that arguably gave a push 
to multi-bi aid due to its objective to enhance donor cooperation, and a linear time trend to 
capture any more general dynamics over time. We use almost all variables in both the delegation 
equations and the earmarking equations, with the sole exception of the Post-Paris Declaration 
dummy, which is relevant only for the decision on double delegation, but not for the decision on 
earmarking, once the decision for double delegation is taken. 
Model Specification 
For our quantitative analysis, we need to take into account that the equations, which estimate the 
effect on double delegation, and the equations, which estimate the effect on earmarking, are not 
independent from each other. When there is no double delegation, there is no earmarking. A 
standard Heckman selection model is not appropriate because double delegation is not measured 
as a zero-one decision, but rather as the percentage of EU’s multi-bi aid given to a specific 
recipient in each year. Reducing this variable to an indicator variable of no double delegation 
versus some double delegation would lead both to a loss of information and to an arbitrary 
decision about the cut-off to use. We therefore resort to a more flexible version of a Conditional 
Mixed Process (CMP) model that allows us to jointly estimate the two regressions in an extended 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework (Roodman 2009). In addition, we cluster 
standard errors at the recipient level. 
The use of recipient fixed effects would in principle be compatible with this framework, but 
leads to some difficulties in our context because many of our variables of interest are time-
invariant country characteristics that are collinear with recipient-fixed effects and hence would 
drop out in fixed-effects estimation. To preempt concerns about the potential bias due to omitted 
time-invariant variables, we tested for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity using the 
Mundlak approach. We added the cross-section means of all variables to our model and 
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conducted an F-test on their joint significance. This approach works as a diagnostic device of 
unobserved heterogeneity because a linear combination of these variable means approximates the 
fixed effects (Mundlak 1978; Chamberlain 1979; Wooldridge 2002). As the F-test was not 
significant in either the double delegation model or the earmarking model, fixed effects do not 
seem necessary in our analysis.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the CMP estimation, whereby Table 1 focuses on the double 
delegation model, and Table 2 on the earmarking model. In both tables, the first two columns 
refer to geographic earmarking and/or member heterogeneity while the remaining two refer to 
sector earmarking and/or heterogeneity. Within each set of regressions, the second column 
provides some more refined specification of the capacity related variables (see below). We 
structure the discussion around the three hypotheses discussed above. 
Capacity and Experience 
As expected, double delegation is significantly less frequent in the regions in which the EC itself 
already has a long-term experience in collaboration. According to the size of the coefficient 
estimates, the probability of projects in ACP countries to be funded through the channel of other 
IDOs is about 0.8 to 1.6 percentage points lower than for other countries. This effect is non-
negligible given that for much of the period under consideration, the share of projects with 
double delegation was below 5% overall. Common language—arguably facilitating the work for 
EC staff—shows an even greater effect in reducing the probability of double delegation by up to 
two percentage points. In contrast, the coefficients for ENP countries (while comparable in size 
to those of ACP countries) never become significant, probably because the EC has focused on 
this region only relatively recently. The variable that accounts for EC staff does not become 
significant either. This may be because the only information we could collect is related to the 
EC’s total staff, which does not capture the regional variety in capacity available in the different 
country offices. When looking at World Bank capacity in comparison, the simple existence of a 
World Bank office does not seem to play a role, possibly because the Bank is present in almost 
all recipient countries so that there is little variation on this variable. However, considering the 
amount of resources it handles, the expected effect becomes visible (Table 1, columns 2 and 4). 
The Commission is less likely to double delegate when the World Bank office is small, and vice 
versa.  
Overall, while the variables we include as indicators of EC capacity are not always 
significant, all coefficients point in the expected direction. Greater experience and capacity more 
generally tend to reduce the probability of double delegation. Our qualitative results are largely 
in line with the outcome of our quantitative analysis. Many interviewees at all three levels of the 
double delegation chain (member countries, Commission, and IDO) mentioned capacity 
constraints as one of the key reasons for the Commission to delegate aid further. In our 
interviews, World Bank officials stated that the EU valued the Bank for its “broad network of 
contacts on the ground needed for rapid implementation.” This and other related statements 
imply that the EU delegates its foreign aid resources to IDOs mainly to take advantage of their 
expertise and related efficiency gains. The EC’s capacity constraints are primarily related to its 
rapid increases in foreign aid resources that have gone unmatched with proportional increases in 
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Table 1: Double Delegation model 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ACP country -0.833* -1.404*** -1.052** -1.556*** 
 (0.495) (0.541) (0.510) (0.526) 
ENP country -0.957 -1.317 -0.953 -1.300 
 (0.755) (0.816) (0.749) (0.808) 
Common language -1.851** -2.010** -1.737** -1.892** 
 (0.748) (0.787) (0.715) (0.759) 
Log(EC staff) -1.930 -5.814 -2.170 -6.311 
 (3.301) (4.378) (3.392) (4.479) 
WB office -1.327 -2.417*** -1.401 -2.275*** 
 (1.278) (0.732) (1.403) (0.603) 
Log(WB amount)  -1.208***  -1.187*** 
  (0.253)  (0.245) 
WB office x Log(WB amount)  1.161***  1.176*** 
  (0.241)  (0.239) 
Export share by EU-3 -0.139* -0.140* -0.117* -0.124* 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.070) (0.071) 
Log(Life expectancy) -2.754** -4.718*** -3.011** -4.909*** 
 (1.320) (1.694) (1.294) (1.770) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.127 0.302 0.048 0.241 
 (0.256) (0.345) (0.235) (0.321) 
Fragile state 0.243 0.320 0.206 0.309 
 (0.577) (0.623) (0.580) (0.632) 
Geographic heterogeneity -0.064 0.057   
 (0.364) (0.541)   
Sector heterogeneity   0.304 0.465 
   (0.330) (0.391) 
EC aid growth 0.267 -0.803 0.270 -0.925 
 (1.426) (1.449) (1.437) (1.469) 
Post-Paris Declaration 1.310** 1.729** 1.391*** 1.820** 
 (0.524) (0.709) (0.531) (0.735) 
Linear trend 0.356*** 0.409*** 0.368*** 0.420*** 
 (0.100) (0.125) (0.095) (0.115) 
Observations 1542 1190 1533 1188 
Recipient countries 125 121 125 121 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
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Table 2: Earmarking Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Geographic earmarking Sector earmarking 
ACP country -4.385** -3.248 -6.482 -7.877 
(2.062) (2.340) (5.325) (5.227) 
ENP country -0.520 -1.248 2.137 2.698 
(2.151) (1.285) (3.737) (3.927) 
Common language 3.190** 1.386 10.653*** 10.185** 
(1.464) (1.174) (4.125) (4.082) 
Log(EC staff) 74.559*** 58.857*** -9.502 -11.441 
(15.351) (14.914) (37.138) (38.270) 
WB office -4.614* 1.115 12.325** 13.346*** 
(2.629) (1.894) (5.019) (4.964) 
Log(WB amount) -0.185 -0.731 
(0.239) (0.659) 
Export share by EU-3 0.397*** 0.294** 0.322 0.377 
(0.144) (0.136) (0.277) (0.274) 
Log(Life expectancy) 15.670 8.609 27.578* 16.164 
(10.524) (10.654) (15.099) (16.586) 
Log(GDP per capita) -2.329** -0.412 -5.421*** -4.237** 
(0.935) (0.850) (1.618) (1.725) 
Fragile state 2.203* 0.755 -1.687 -0.351 
(1.262) (1.208) (3.268) (3.421) 
Geographic heterogeneity 3.967*** 3.209** 
(1.209) (1.376) 
Sector heterogeneity 9.130** 5.575 
(3.677) (3.397) 
EC aid growth 16.963*** 13.101*** 46.964*** 46.905*** 
(4.874) (4.200) (16.401) (17.792) 
Linear trend -1.200*** -0.991*** -1.476** -1.448** 
  (0.271) (0.231) (0.583) (0.632) 
Number of observations 655 562 655 562 
Recipient countries 125 121 125 121 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 
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capacity. While our respondents at EC headquarters in Brussels focus on staff numbers when 
they speak about capacity, other sources see the capacity deficits primarily in a lack of 
experience in the field of development cooperation (see also Michaelowa, Reinsberg and 
Schneider 2016). One EC official directly stated that the EC gained additional benefit due to the 
comfort of delegating aid further and “’getting things done’ without a lot of own human 
resources.” According to a regional expert at the World Bank, the EC may lack capacities for 
processing its aid even in its own neighborhood. This could explain why even the ENP variable 
does not become significant in our statistical analysis; only with ACP countries, significantly 
more experience seems to have accumulated over time. When EC capacity is lacking, according 
to the same regional expert, the Bank “is an efficient partner to accelerate aid absorption on the 
ground, given its in-house knowledge and its dense network of contractors.” The EC sometimes 
“asks the World Bank for specific inputs that the EC itself would not be able to deliver in a 
timely manner.” For example, the EC asked the World Bank for a feasibility study on an energy 
market project in the Caspian region.  
If a project is then delegated anyway, do the same factors increase the probability that the 
Commission gets involved in the details of aid allocation through specific earmarking? Our 
quantitative results support this interpretation, but the results are less clear than for double 
delegation itself: Common language increases the probability of earmarking and greater EC staff 
numbers do, too, albeit only in terms of geographic conditions, not in terms of sectoral 
conditions. For geographic earmarking, the coefficients are very large, suggesting a 59-75 
percentage point higher probability of earmarking. The results for local World Bank capacity are 
ambiguous and again in line with our expectations only for geographic earmarking. Results for 
ACP countries are mostly insignificant, just as those for ENP countries, and with coefficients 
that suggest a negative rather than a positive relationship with earmarking (if any). As opposed to 
our expectations, despite its knowledge and experience with these countries, once the 
Commission delegated to IDOs, it does not tend to earmark projects specifically for individual 
countries within the ACP or ENP region, nor does it have a higher tendency for sector 
earmarking in these regions.  
Our qualitative research suggests that the failure to earmark may be explained by the fact 
that the EC does not have much appetite to tightly earmark its contributions. Yet earmarking was 
never mentioned as overly resource intensive for the Commission. While World Bank officials 
report that working with the EU in the context of trust fund arrangements is at times extremely 
work-intensive, this seems to be related primarily to legal provisions and oversight clauses the 
Commission regularly requests. Our interviews suggest that for EC staff this appears to be of less 
concern, possibly because their legal and administrative capacity (as opposed to their 
developmental experience and capacity) is rather high (OECD 2012). The limited support for the 
link between capacity and earmarking is in line with our quantitative results: It appears that the 
effect of capacity primarily works via the decision on double delegation, and not so much via 
earmarking. Overall, the findings hence provide only partial support for Hypothesis 1. The role 
of capacity with respect to earmarking (Hypothesis 1b) is more difficult to establish than the role 
of capacity for double delegation (Hypothesis 1a), where the evidence is much clearer.  
Strategic Interest  
Apart from the regional variables discussed above, which can also be interpreted in terms of 
strategic interest, we find some evidence for the role of strategic interest through trade- and 
poverty-related variables. As expected, recipients that are important destinations of EU exports 
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tend to receive funding directly from the EC rather than via other IDOs, and if at all aid is 
double-delegated there is a much higher probability for this aid to be geographically earmarked. 
More specifically, if a recipient imports twice as much from the three major EU members 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom than some other recipient, the former has a 10 to 14 
percentage points higher chance to receive aid funding directly from the EC (Table 1), and—if 
there is double delegation nevertheless—a 30 to 40 percentage points higher probability that this 
funding is earmarked geographically to this specific recipient country (Table 2).  
With respect to those variables that reflect aid allocation for developmental rather than 
strategic purposes we find the opposite effect, as expected. However, our two indicators life 
expectancy and GDP per capita are obviously highly correlated. Not surprisingly, only one of 
them is usually significant in our models.3 In the double delegation model, this is life expectancy, 
and in the earmarking model, this is GDP per capita. When life expectancy doubles, there is a 
three- to five-percentage point reduction in double delegation, and when GDP per capita doubles, 
there is a two- to five-percentage point reduction in the probability of earmarking. The results 
support our expectation that the EC is more likely to reap the benefits of double delegation if aid 
resources are allocated based on the recipients’ developmental needs rather than on EU 
members’ strategic interests. The additional indicator variable for fragile states is mostly 
insignificant, which is interesting because it tends to be an important driver of multi-bi aid by 
bilateral donors (Reinsberg et al. 2017). 
Overall, these results indicate the importance of strategic interests in the decision to double 
delegate and also to earmark delegated aid. This finds further support in our qualitative research. 
In the words of a Bank official, “the EC has its thematic priorities,” which “respond to salient 
member state interests.” Another World Bank staff member said that given that the EC now 
manages a significant multilateral budget, “it is unavoidable that those pressures [from 
influential donor countries] are scaled up at the European level.” Similar views were mentioned 
by EC officials. One official stated that “[…] large member states influence implementation on 
important issues” and thereby “reinforce their own bilateral agenda at the EU level.” It seems to 
happen rather frequently that the EU requires tighter control than all other donors contributing to 
World Bank trust funds. To accommodate these special requirements of the EU, the World Bank 
specifically introduced the instrument of “notional agreements”, which implicitly allows 
earmarking related to sub-sectors otherwise prohibited by World Bank rules (World Bank 2013b: 
6). Overall, the above results generally support Hypothesis 2a and b. 
Heterogeneous preferences 
As argued above, in case of heterogeneous preferences of EU members, the most skeptical EU 
member must be ensured that its interests will not be violated through a loss of control induced 
by double delegation. As a consequence, we expect generally less double delegation, and if any, 
it should be accompanied by tighter earmarking than in the case of homogenous preferences. We 
find no evidence for an effect on delegation (Table 1, columns 1-4). However, we find a highly 
significant positive effect of heterogeneous member preferences on earmarking (Table 2).  
These results do not provide any support for Hypothesis 3a, but for Hypothesis 3b. 
Apparently, reluctant member countries accept double delegation if the earmarking ensures that 
their specific interests are taken into account. Our qualitative research supports this view. One 
EC official said that “the EC will anticipate potential problems in the relevant committee and not 
                                                            
3 We also conducted regressions with either one of these indicators, which did not change the results. 
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propose projects that do not find common support,” implying that the EC must propose an 
allocation that respects all member states’ salient interests, so that greater heterogeneity of 
interests would predict a higher level of earmarking. Only in those cases, in which exceptionally, 
earmarking is not accepted by the IDO, the preferences of individual member states sometimes 
prevent double delegation altogether. For example, a Bank official mentioned that in the 
Sustainable Energy Partnership, the EC could not contribute to hydropower plants because there 
were reservations against this type of energy from some of the EU member countries that 
prevented the EC from supporting the program with unearmarked funds. However, even in such 
cases the problem can usually be circumvented by generating a parallel single donor trust fund 
with more narrowly defined objectives for the EC alone. Hence eventually, double delegation 
can take place anyway. 
Robustness tests 
To analyze whether the above results depend on the joint estimation of the double delegation and 
the earmarking model within the CMP framework, we present separate estimations of these 
models using random-effects estimations in the Appendix (Tables A3 and A4). Results are very 
similar and confirm the role of EC capacity on the one hand, and strategic considerations on the 
other. The estimations also show the lack of any effect of heterogeneous EU member preferences 
on double delegation, and the contrasting strong effect on earmarking. 
We also explore the effect of member heterogeneity further, by including interaction terms 
with other variables, namely with the regional dummies for ACP and ENP countries, common 
language, and the EU-3 export share (Appendix, Tables A5 and A6). We do so in the CMP 
(columns 1 and 3) and in the separate models (columns 2 and 4). However, the corresponding 
interaction terms hardly ever turn out to be significant. Hence we conclude that there is no 
systematic influence of member heterogeneity on the other main effects described above. 
In sum, the results suggest that double delegation is indeed driven by a certain trade-off 
between efficiency gains of delegation, notably when the EC’s capacity is low, and the interest to 
control aid allocation, especially when strategic interests are at stake. There seems to be no major 
issue of agency slippage between the Commission and the EU member countries as its 
principals, but in case of heterogeneous member preferences, individual members with 
particularly salient preferences seem to negotiate a deal with the Commission that ensures that in 
case of double delegation, their special interests are protected through earmarking.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper offers a theory of the politics of double delegation in the European Union. The EU 
has emerged as the most important multilateral donor of development finance over the last 
decade. While EU development finance has contributed to the visibility and importance of the 
EU as a foreign policy actor, the Commission frequently faces capacity constraints. To balance 
the incentives to maximize visibility and the need to allocate foreign aid effectively, the 
Commission double delegates foreign aid to other IDOs whenever its capacity constraints are 
high and EU member states’ need to control the allocation of foreign aid are low. Our qualitative 
and quantitative analyses provide support for this argument. We find that capacity constraints 
play an important role in the decision to double delegate. We also find that EU members’ 
strategic interest put constraints on this delegation to other IDOs. When such interests are strong, 
either double delegation does not take place at all, or control is maintained through tighter 
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earmarking.  When EU member preferences are heterogeneous, the level of control to be 
maintained depends on the most skeptical member state. This is reflected in an even higher level 
of earmarking.  
The empirical findings shed some light on the puzzle of why the EU as an international 
development organization itself delegates to other IDOs. They indicate that even though the EU 
as a multilateral donor outspends the World Bank, it is still dependent on other more established 
development organizations as vehicles to maximize the effectiveness of its aid. The benefits from 
double delegation are particularly felt for foreign aid resources that support projects in the 
poorest regions of the world. With these findings, the paper contributes to a better understanding 
of theories of delegation in international relations. We believe that they are relevant beyond the 
EU since double delegation is a much broader phenomenon. Our findings could thus be used to 
extend the EU-specific theory to a more general theory of double delegation in international 
cooperation.  
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Table A1: Variable description and sources 
 
Variable obs mean sd min max Variable description Source 
Dependent variables        
Double delegation (%) 3032 1.66 5.35 0.00 100.00 Percentage of EC aid activities delegated to IDOs (so-
called multi-bi aid) in a given country in a given year 
Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) 
Sector earmarking (%) 756 18.68 30.72 0.00 100.00 Percentage of multi-bi aid activities by the EC that are 
strictly earmarked at the project level (rather than being 
only thematically earmarked or not earmarked) 
Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) 
Geographic earmarking 
(%) 
756 93.81 20.43 0.00 100.00 Percentage of multi-bi aid activities by the EC that are 
strictly earmarked at the country level (rather than being 
only regionally earmarked) 
Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) 
Capacity variables        
ACP country 3032 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator variable for aid activity being 
implemented in ACP countries (CRS) 
OECD (2013b) 
ENP country 3032 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator variable for aid activity being 
implemented in ENP countries (CRS) 
OECD (2013b) 
Common language 2844 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator variable for common language with any 
EU country (CEPII data) 
Mayer and Zignago (2006) 
Log(EC staff) 3032 9.73 0.13 9.42 9.90 Annual count of operational staff in the European 
Commission (including both headquarters and country 
offices)  
Own coding based on EU budget 
reports 
WB office 3032 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator for presence of World Bank country 
office  
Own coding based on webpage 
search 
Log (WB amount) 1899 3.90 2.05 0.00 9.00 Total project amount made available from IBRD/IDA 
sources for the recipient country (World Bank project 
database). Specifically, ln(1+WB amount) was used in 
order to avoid missing values. 
World Bank (2013c) 
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(Non-)strategic variables        
Export share by EU-3 (%) 2789 0.65 1.86 0.00 27.64 Lag of export by EU-3 (Germany, France and United 
Kingdom) to a recipient country in percent of total 
exports to all recipients 
Eurostat (2015) 
Log(Life expectancy) 2690 4.13 0.16 3.30 4.39 Life expectancy at birth of recipient country (total 
population) [SP.DYN.LE00.IN] 
World Bank (2014) 
Log(GDP per capita) 2645 7.20 1.14 4.24 10.02 GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 
[NY.GDP.PCAP.KD] 
World Bank (2014) 
Fragile state 2744 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 Binary indicator for country being in the lowest quintile 
of the annual distribution of 'quality of governance' 
measured by the ICRG index (or the World Bank 
Governance Indicator on Control of Corruption in case of 
the ICRG index did not cover a given country) 
Own computation based on World 
Bank (2014) 
Heterogeneity variables        
Geographic heterogeneity 3027 1.10 1.00 0.00 3.87 Coefficient of variation of bilateral donor preferences of 
the EU-15 states based on the geographic allocation of 
their bilateral aid (available data limited to EU-15, see 
CRS). For computational details, see below. 
OECD (2013b) 
Sector heterogeneity 2915 2.86 0.67 1.19 3.87 Coefficient of variation of bilateral donor preferences of 
the EU-15 states based on the sectoral allocation of their 
bilateral aid (available data limited to EU-15, see CRS) . 
For computational details, see below. 
OECD (2013b) 
Control variables        
EC aid growth 3032 0.06 0.10 -0.15 0.31 Rate of aid growth of the European Commission (DAC1) OECD (2013a) 
Post-Paris Declaration 3032 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 Dichotomous indicator variable for years after 2005  
Linear trend 3032 2002.04 6.29 1990.00 2012.00 Sample year, capturing a linear time trend   
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Formal Exposition of the Heterogeneity Variables: 
 
Let ݌௠௜௧ be a dummy indicating whether EU member m (m=1, …, 15) allocates bilateral aid to recipient i in year t. Our measure of geographic heterogeneity between EU member countries 
൫ܪ௜௧௚௘௢൯	is then given by:  
ܪ௜௧௚௘௢ ൌ
ට 115∑ ቀ݌௠௜௧ െ
1
15∑ ݌௠௜௧ଵହ௠ୀଵ ቁ
ଶଵହ௠ୀଵ
1
15∑ ݌௠௜௧ଵହ௠ୀଵ
 (1)
 
Similarly, we can use the information whether EU member m allocates bilateral aid to sector 
s (s=1, …, S) in recipient i in year t (݌௠௦௜௧ሻ to obtain the coefficient of variation for each sector. Since our unit of analysis is the recipient-year and does not vary by sector, we compute the 
average of these sectoral coefficients of variation within each recipient. The resulting measure for 
sector heterogeneity between EU member countries ሺܪ௜௧௦௘௖௧௢௥ሻ	is then given by:  
ܪ௜௧௦௘௖௧௢௥ ൌ 1ܵ෍
ට 115∑ ቀ݌௠௦௜௧ െ
1
15∑ ݌௠௦௜௧ଵହ௠ୀଵ ቁ
ଶଵହ௠ୀଵ
1
15∑ ݌௠௦௜௧ଵହ௠ୀଵ
ௌ
௦ୀଵ
 (2)
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Table A2: List of interviews (anonymized) 
 
 Date Institution Role 
1 19/07/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Coordinator 
2 24/07/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Coordinator 
3 25/07/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Coordinator 
4 26/07/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Manager 
5 30/07/2013 World Bank Donor relations 
6 31/07/2013 World Bank Donor relations 
7 02/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Manager 
8 06/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Manager 
9 08/08/2013 World Bank Donor relations 
10 08/08/2013 World Bank Director 
11 09/08/2013 World Bank Director 
12 12/08/2013 World Bank Donor relations 
13 13/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Coordinator 
14 14/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Manager 
15 23/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Coordinator 
16 23/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Manager 
17 26/08/2013 World Bank Advisor 
18 27/08/2013 World Bank Trust Fund Coordinator 
19 04/11/2014 European Union Director 
20 04/11/2014 European Union Deputy Head 
21 04/11/2014 European Union Deputy Head 
22 04/11/2014 European Union Head of Unit 
23 04/11/2014 European Union Deputy Head 
24 04/11/2014 European Union Deputy Head 
25 04/11/2014 European Union Assistant 
26 04/11/2014 European Union Head of Unit 
27 04/11/2014 European Union Advisor to the Director-General 
28 04/11/2014 European Union Assistant 
29 05/11/2014 European Union Director 
30 05/11/2014 European Union Director 
31 05/11/2014 European Union Head of Unit 
32 05/11/2014 European Union Assistant 
33 05/11/2014 European Union Director 
34 05/11/2014 European Union Director 
35 11/11/2014 European Union Head of Unit 
36 08/12/2014 European Union Director 
37 03/11/2015 European Union Director 
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38 11/06/2013 Member state Deputy Director General 
39 05/11/2014 Member state Head of Unit 
39 05/11/2014 Member state Director 
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Table A3: Double delegation model, random effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ACP country -0.706 -1.167* -1.015* -1.428** 
(0.543) (0.631) (0.609) (0.585) 
ENP country -1.010 -1.526 -0.991 -1.498 
(0.823) (0.955) (0.816) (0.947) 
Common language -2.019** -2.335** -1.880** -2.176** 
(0.818) (1.008) (0.781) (0.963) 
Log(EC staff) -2.444 -6.366 -2.234 -6.338 
(3.444) (4.565) (3.467) (4.540) 
WB office -1.171 -2.044*** -1.301 -1.904***
(1.254) (0.689) (1.439) (0.597) 
Log(WB amount) -1.107*** -1.087***
(0.222) (0.228) 
WB office x Log(WB amount) 1.107*** 1.106***
(0.235) (0.229) 
Export share by EU-3 -0.159** -0.178* -0.134* -0.156* 
(0.080) (0.097) (0.076) (0.091) 
Log(Life expectancy) -2.258 -3.674* -2.671 -3.971** 
(1.602) (1.977) (1.675) (1.960) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.128 0.275 0.029 0.187 
(0.278) (0.369) (0.258) (0.348) 
Fragile state 0.097 0.268 0.075 0.262 
(0.428) (0.532) (0.428) (0.535) 
Geographic heterogeneity -0.146 0.067 
(0.343) (0.487) 
Sector heterogeneity 0.324 0.532 
(0.368) (0.454) 
EC aid growth 0.292 -1.024 0.319 -1.066 
(1.448) (1.554) (1.450) (1.547) 
Post-Paris Declaration 1.350** 1.725** 1.350** 1.749** 
(0.531) (0.691) (0.532) (0.693) 
Linear trend 0.344*** 0.384*** 0.362*** 0.397***
(0.096) (0.118) (0.092) (0.107) 
Number of observations 1542 1190 1533 1188 
Overall R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.15 
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Table A4: Earmarking model, random effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Geographic earmarking Sector earmarking 
ACP country -3.228 -2.146 -6.968 -8.305 
(2.058) (2.223) (5.471) (5.445) 
ENP country -0.418 -1.448 2.099 2.789 
(2.481) (1.734) (3.851) (3.961) 
Common language 4.445** 2.558* 10.710** 10.435** 
(1.826) (1.346) (4.206) (4.237) 
Log(EC staff) 67.790*** 54.219*** -4.622 -7.932 
(13.994) (12.705) (37.330) (38.423) 
WB office -2.822 2.049 12.333** 13.106** 
(2.683) (1.991) (5.170) (5.098) 
Log(WB amount) -0.197 -0.676 
(0.260) (0.674) 
WB office x Log(WB amount) --- --- 
--- --- 
Export share by EU-3 0.501** 0.444** 0.330 0.395 
(0.199) (0.219) (0.278) (0.281) 
Log(Life expectancy) 32.264** 23.112 25.738 15.094 
(13.939) (14.091) (16.011) (17.729) 
Log(GDP per capita) -3.314** -1.245 -5.469*** -4.225** 
(1.351) (1.351) (1.630) (1.744) 
Fragile state 4.341** 3.267* -1.516 0.263 
(1.810) (1.866) (3.288) (3.509) 
Geographic heterogeneity 4.788*** 3.521** 
(1.584) (1.767) 
Sector heterogeneity 8.692** 5.620* 
(3.523) (3.260) 
EC aid growth 15.329*** 11.867*** 47.136*** 46.673*** 
(4.961) (4.117) (16.444) (17.797) 
Linear trend -1.164*** -1.018*** -1.449** -1.418** 
(0.250) (0.233) (0.587) (0.642) 
Number of observations 655 562 655 562 
Overall R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 
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Table A5: Double delegation model, additional interactions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ACP country -0.829 0.086 -0.922 1.435 
(0.953) (0.989) (2.023) (2.020) 
ACP country x heterogeneity -0.417 -1.874 -0.017 -1.045 
(1.415) (1.411) (0.854) (0.882) 
ENP country -1.797 -2.069 2.015 0.931 
(1.799) (1.829) (4.095) (4.429) 
ENP country x heterogeneity 1.562 1.851 -1.202 -0.785 
(2.862) (2.731) (1.773) (1.785) 
Common language -3.182** -4.396*** 0.032 -3.782 
(1.463) (1.589) (3.152) (2.899) 
Common language x heterogeneity 2.526 4.461** -0.760 0.831 
(2.279) (2.262) (1.441) (1.295) 
WB office -1.451 -1.354 -1.320 -1.318 
(1.372) (1.325) (1.399) (1.405) 
Export share by EU-3 -0.186** -0.246** 0.383 -0.188 
(0.090) (0.115) (0.369) (0.389) 
Export share by EU-3 x heterogeneity 0.110 0.329 -0.256 0.030 
(0.288) (0.270) (0.200) (0.219) 
Log(Life expectancy) -3.458*** -3.041* -2.842** -2.664* 
(1.246) (1.671) (1.196) (1.507) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.133 0.098 0.090 0.018 
(0.267) (0.284) (0.239) (0.266) 
Fragile state 0.223 -0.003 0.234 0.034 
(0.602) (0.431) (0.593) (0.437) 
Geographic heterogeneity -1.995 -2.604 
(3.050) (2.796) 
Sector heterogeneity 1.024 0.431 
(1.444) (1.238) 
EC aid growth 0.482 0.537 0.578 0.597 
(1.260) (1.274) (1.268) (1.287) 
Post-Paris Declaration 1.156** 1.140** 1.178** 1.142** 
(0.487) (0.499) (0.487) (0.503)
Linear trend 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.349*** 0.352*** 
(0.100) (0.096) (0.085) (0.081) 
Number of observations 1542 1542 1533 1533 
Recipient countries 125 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
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Table A6: Earmarking model, additional interactions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Geographic earmarking Sector earmarking 
ACP country -3.209 2.221 -17.532 -16.597 
(2.726) (9.209) (20.362) (20.983) 
ACP country x heterogeneity -4.067 -2.204 4.174 3.315 
(4.076) (3.835) (9.736) (9.971) 
ENP country 2.007 11.386 2.733 -0.476 
(3.491) (7.084) (22.200) (23.731) 
ENP country x heterogeneity -7.016 -4.834 0.181 1.397 
(9.821) (3.522) (8.878) (9.506) 
Common language 0.359 -0.759 -12.557 -15.676 
(2.191) (6.828) (20.773) (21.625) 
Common language x heterogeneity 7.288 2.254 9.707 11.104 
(4.664) (3.090) (9.789) (10.179) 
WB office -6.050** -3.007 11.709** 11.303** 
(2.720) (2.642) (5.225) (5.434) 
Export share by EU-3 0.300** 2.392 1.095 1.013 
(0.118) (2.465) (1.585) (1.708) 
Export share by EU-3 x heterogeneity 1.323** -1.029 -0.560 -0.505 
(0.591) (1.328) (0.871) (0.930) 
Log(Life expectancy) 15.892 35.978** 21.346 19.262 
(10.920) (14.991) (15.517) (16.702) 
Log(GDP per capita) -2.475** -3.196** -4.923*** -5.046***
(0.976) (1.390) (1.581) (1.597) 
Fragile state 2.586* 4.985** -0.887 -0.818 
(1.393) (2.079) (3.314) (3.315) 
Geographic heterogeneity 1.663 4.475* 
(1.849) (2.436) 
Sector heterogeneity -1.714 -2.323 
(5.101) (5.011) 
EC aid growth 1.169 1.155 48.447*** 47.723***
(4.268) (4.391) (14.067) (14.327) 
Linear trend -0.188 -0.360* -1.601*** -1.515***
  (0.226) (0.192) (0.564) (0.568) 
Number of observations 655 655 655 655 
Recipient countries 125 117 125 117 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 
 
